`Antigravity IDE` update migration can fail on existing `mcp_config.json` symlink

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• #0001

  #0001Agents & toolsGoogle AI Forum1 hour ago

  `Antigravity` extension install and skill/plugin management issues reported

  50radar

  AntigravityAgentic development IDE — skill and plugin based workflows

  Clean installs can fail to import VS Code extensions, and old skills need directory reshaping. The bigger tax is context pollution: plugins cannot be toggled off yet.

  • —VS Code extension import can fail on a clean Windows install; renaming ~/.antigravity to antigravity-ide is the stated workaround.
  • —Old global skills are recognized but hidden from the global skill list because Antigravity does not recursively scan skill folders.
  • —Skills now sit in plugin chunks; matching .gemini/config/plugins/science structure makes them appear as plugin:science.
  • —Plugins cannot be enabled or disabled, so every skill collection keeps adding context. That is a real cost for small-agent setups.

  Source: discuss.ai.google.dev/t/more-antigravity-issues/145875Read original →
• #0002

  #0002Agents & toolsGoogle AI Forum3 hours ago

  `Antigravity 2.0` Drops Integrated IDE Workflow

  50radar

  AntigravityAI coding tool — IDE-style workflow discussed on Google AI forum

  The main app lost editor, terminal, and source control flow. Update only after checking whether your daily coding loop survives the split.

  • —Reports mention the editor workflow missing after Antigravity 2.0; that turns a coding agent into a slower app handoff.
  • —The IDE opens the wrong app, so project context switching becomes a real friction point during edits.
  • —No terminal or source control in the main app means core dev loops are split across tools.

  Source: discuss.ai.google.dev/t/antigravity-2-0-removed-the-inteRead original →
• #0003

  #0003Agents & toolsGeekNews3 hours ago

  GitHub Internal Repos Accessed After Employee Device Compromise

  40radar

  A poisoned VS Code extension became the entry point. Treat editor extensions as supply-chain risk, not convenienceware.

  • —Attack path: a compromised employee endpoint via malicious VS Code extension, followed by access to internal repositories.
  • —GitHub removed the malicious extension version and isolated the endpoint. Extension version pinning and review matter for dev machines.
  • —No concrete customer-impact detail is available in the provided text. Actionable takeaway stays limited to workstation hardening.

  Source: news.hada.io/topic?id=29703Read original →